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PROTECTING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: 
THE RESIDUAL CLAUSE IN THE 
MANDATORY GUIDELINES IS  
VOID FOR VAGUENESS 
OLIVIA M. TOURGEE† 
INTRODUCTION 
Before 2005, federal judges were mandated to compute a 
criminal defendant’s sentence by following boilerplate, 
mandatory sentencing Guidelines (the “Mandatory Guidelines”) 
that often doubled or tripled the sentence once applied.1  For 
instance, a defendant’s sentence could increase from four and one 
half years to life,2 or from five years to 155 years.3  Judges had no 
discretion to decrease the length or gravity of the sentence based 
on ameliorating circumstances unique to the crime and 
defendant at hand.4  Resulting sentences were thus often unjust.  
The Mandatory Guidelines present constitutional concerns that 
disrupt the very foundation of the American legal system:  They 
violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by failing to 
provide notice to individuals and encouraging abritrary 
enforcement by judges.5 
Specifically, this Note focuses on defendants who were 
eligible for a sentencing enhancement as a career offender under 
the Mandatory Guidelines’ residual clause.  Under United States 
Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1, a presiding judge was mandated to 
apply a sentencing enhancement under the career offender 
guideline if a defendant’s instant offense was a crime of violence 
 
† Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2019, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2016, Fairfield University.  With 
overwhelming gratitude to the St. John’s Law Review editors and staffers for their 
dedication and diligent efforts throughout the publication process.  The author also 
thanks her parents and sister for their unwavering love and support. 
1 See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 361–62 (4th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc) (Motz, J., dissenting); United States v. Rodriguez, 73 F.3d 161, 162–63 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
2 Rodriguez, 73 F.3d at 162–63. 
3 Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 361–62. 
4 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005). 
5 See infra Part III.A. 
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and the defendant had at least two prior felony convictions that 
qualify as crimes of violence.6  A crime of violence is defined 
under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.2(a)’s residual 
clause as any offense punishable by imprisonment for over a year 
that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another . . . .”7 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have spurred much 
debate, which has resulted in constant litigation and attention 
from the federal courts.  Independent of the judiciary, the United 
States Sentencing Commission (the “Commission”) “establish[es] 
sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice 
system that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating 
detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for 
offenders convicted of federal crimes.”8  The Commission derives 
this power from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the “Act”), 
which “provides for the development of guidelines that will 
further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, 
incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.”9  The 
Commission sets guideline ranges for criminal acts based on a 
collection of factors.10  The Act sought to effectuate a “fair 
sentencing system” through honesty and uniformity in 
sentencing.11  Appellate courts can review the trial courts’ 
sentencing decisions.12 
 
6 Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–34 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). The career 
offender guideline applies if: 
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant 
committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of 
conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence . . . ; and (3) the 
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of . . . a crime of 
violence . . . . 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
7 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2009) (amended 2015). A crime of violence, in full, is defined as: 
any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year, that— (1) has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) 
is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another. 
Id. 
8 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A1.1, introductory cmt. (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
9 Id. ch. 1, pt. A1.2. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. ch. 1, pt. A1.3. In addition, the Commission adopted a “departure policy,” 
meaning that courts can depart from the guideline range, because “it is difficult to 
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There are four Supreme Court decisions that are of 
particular relevance to the discussion of Mandatory Guidelines.  
First, the Court held in United States v. Booker that the 
Mandatory Guidelines are unconstitutional, which rendered the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as only advisory (the “Advisory 
Guidelines”).13  Second, the Court in Johnson v. United States 
(“Johnson II”), held that the Armed Criminal Career Act’s (the 
“ACCA”) residual clause, which is identical to the residual clause 
of the Mandatory Guidelines, is void for vagueness.14  Third, the 
Court held in Beckles v. United States that the Advisory 
Guidelines were not vulnerable to vagueness challenges.15  A 
unique issue is now presented because there is no clear authority 
on whether defendant-appellants sentenced under the 
Mandatory Guidelines can bring a void-for-vagueness claim.  In 
fact, “[w]hether the Mandatory Guidelines are amenable to 
vagueness challenges is an issue of first impression in [most] 
circuit[s], and one that is sure to recur in light of Johnson [II] 
and Beckles.”16  Fourth and finally, in Brown v. United States, the 
Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to defendant-
appellants seeking to challenge the constitutionality of their 
sentences imposed under the Mandatory Guidelines.17  
Importantly, Justice Sotomayor, joined with Justice Ginsburg, 
dissented from this denial of certiorari.18  The dissent outlined 
many of the arguments discussed in this Note. 
The first part of this Note will address the specific problem 
the Mandatory Guidelines present.  First, the Mandatory 
Guidelines will be defined, and the mandatory and binding 
nature of these Mandatory Guidelines will be explored in depth.19  
 
prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human 
conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.” Id. ch. 1, pt. A1.4(b).  
12 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2012). 
13 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). 
14 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015); compare Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012), invalidated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2551 (2015) (“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime . . . that . . . otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another . . . .) with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2009) (amended 2015) ([T]he term ‘crime of violence’ means 
any offense . . . that . . . otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another . . . .).  
15 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017). 
16 United States v. Miller, 868 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2017). 
17 586 U.S. __ (2018). 
18 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
19 Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–35. 
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Second, this Note will explain the significance of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Booker that declared the Mandatory 
Guidelines unconstitutional.20  Third, this Note will evaluate 
Beckles, where the Supreme Court held that the Advisory 
Guidelines were not subject to vagueness challenges.21  Thus, the 
first part of this Note will set the stage for the problem that the 
Mandatory Guidelines present. 
The second part of this Note will discuss and provide a 
solution to the constitutional issues presented by the Mandatory 
Guidelines.  First, defendant-appellants sentenced under the 
Mandatory Guidelines should not be left without a path to 
challenge the unconstitutionality of their sentences.  Instead, 
criminal defendants sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines 
should be able to challenge their sentences.  In support of this 
argument, this Note focuses on Johnson II, where the Supreme 
Court held that the ACCA’s residual clause is void for 
vagueness.22  The ACCA is not the same authority as the 
Mandatory Guidelines; however, this Note argues that the 
Mandatory Guidelines should be treated the same way as the 
ACCA was in Johnson II because the residual clauses of each 
authority have identical language.23 
Second, allowing vagueness challenges to the Mandatory 
Guidelines is a workable and constitutional solution to the grave 
issue presented.  Here, the Note will rely upon Welch v. United 
States, where the Supreme Court held that Johnson II 
announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases 
on collateral review.24  Following the first argument of this 
section, defendant-appellants sentenced under the Mandatory 
Guidelines should be able to raise their constitutional challenge 
under Welch because the circumstances surrounding their 
sentences are identical to those in the ACCA’s residual clause. 
The third part of this Note comprises the four arguments in 
favor of allowing vagueness challenges to the Mandatory 
Guidelines.  First, the Mandatory Guidelines implicate 
 
20 Id. at 244–45 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). 
21 Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017). 
22 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
23 See, e.g., United States v. Sumrall, 690 F.3d 42, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing 
United States v. Jonas, 689 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2012)). 
24 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). This is important since 
many defendant-appellants challenge their sentences by seeking leave to file a 
second or successive motion to vacate their sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). See 
infra Part II.B. 
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vagueness due process concerns.  Second, Johnson II and Beckles 
permit vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines.  
Third, the ACCA and the Mandatory Guidelines should be 
treated identically because of their similar residual clauses.  
Fourth, the Supreme Court has recognized a new rule applicable 
to the Mandatory Guidelines.  Accordingly, defendant-appellants 
sentenced under the residual clause of the Mandatory Guidelines 
should be able to challenge their sentences as void for vagueness. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Significance of the Mandatory Guidelines 
The Mandatory Guidelines present many constitutional and 
practical problems.  First, judges had no discretion.25  The 
Supreme Court held that judges did not have discretion under 
the Mandatory Guidelines:  “The Guidelines as written, however, 
are not advisory; they are mandatory and binding on all 
judges . . . . Because they are binding on judges, we have 
consistently held that the Guidelines have the force and effect of 
laws.”26  Although 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) states that the Mandatory 
Guidelines were one factor to be considered in imposing a 
sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) orders that a court “ ‘shall impose a 
sentence of the kind, and within the range’ established by the 
Guidelines, subject to departures in specific, limited cases.”27  
Specifically, the Mandatory Guidelines allowed departures where 
“the judge ‘finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described.’ ”28 
Yet departures were largely unavailable:  “In most cases, as 
a matter of law, the Commission will have adequately taken all 
relevant factors into account, and no departure will be legally 
permissible. In those instances, the judge is bound to impose a 
 
25 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005) (Steven, J., delivering 
the opinion of the Court in part). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 234 (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000), 
invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). 
28 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000), invalidated by United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). 
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sentence within the Guidelines range.”29  Data from the 
Commission supports this statement.30  In a period just before 
the Booker decision, judges only departed from the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines .8% of the time.31  Even if a sentencing 
judge were to depart from the guideline range, the sentence 
would likely be reversed on appeal.32 
The Supreme Court has continuously emphasized the history 
and importance of judicial discretion in sentencing.33  
Historically, Congress granted district courts “wide discretion in 
deciding whether the defendant should be incarcerated and for 
how long.”34  This broad discretion permitted district courts to 
individualize offenders’ sentences by considering the facts at 
hand and the history of the offender.35  The Supreme Court has 
stressed the significance of discretionary sentencing, adding that 
it has “never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad 
discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range.”36  
Judicial discretion, it seems, composes an essential element of 
the sentencing process.  Yet discretion is exactly what the 
Mandatory Guidelines stripped from district court judges.37 
Second, the Mandatory Guidelines resulted in arbitrary 
sentencing.38  Leading up to Booker in 2005, the Supreme Court 
noticed that judges emphasized “facts that enhanced sentencing 
ranges,” which “increase[d] the judge’s power and diminish[ed] 
that of the jury.”39  Instead, “the judge, not the 
jury, . . . determined the upper limits of sentencing, and the facts 
determined were not required to be raised before trial or proved 
by more than a preponderance.”40  In fact, “[a]s the enhancements 
became greater, the jury’s finding of the underlying crime 
became less significant. And the enhancements became very 
 
29 Id. 
30 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Chapter 3 Adjustments and 
Plea/Trial Rates Pre-Booker 2005, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/resear 
ch-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/guideline-application-frequencies/ 
2005/05_chapter3_pre.pdf. 
31 Id. at 1. 
32 Booker, 543 U.S. at 234–35. 
33 Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892–93 (2017). 
34 Id. at 893 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 233). 
37 See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–35. 
38 United States v. Parks, No. 03-CR-00490-WYD, 2017 WL 3732078, at *5 (D. 
Colo. Aug. 1, 2017). 
39 Booker, 543 U.S. at 236. 
40 Id. 
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serious indeed.”41  For instance, the sentencing judge in Booker 
enhanced Booker’s sentence from 262 months (about twenty-two 
years) to life.42  Other examples include judges increasing 
defendants’ sentences from fifteen years to twenty-five years,43 
from seventy-eight months (about six and a half years) to 235 
months (about twenty years), from fifty-four months (about four 
and a half years) to life,44 and from fifty-seven months (about five 
years) to 155 years.45 
Finally, there is a substantial number of defendant-
appellants sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines.  The 
Commission conducted a study on the application of Guideline 
provisions.46  From November 2004 to January 2005, the 
Commission received a staggering 18,788 cases where the 
Mandatory Guidelines were applied.47  Therefore, the Mandatory 
Guidelines presented several problems within the criminal 
sentencing system. 
B. Booker: The Shockwave that Struck Criminal Sentencing 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory before 
United States v. Booker came down in 2005.48  In Booker, the 
Supreme Court held that the Mandatory Guidelines were 
unconstitutional, rendering them only advisory in nature.49  The 
Court described how the Mandatory Guidelines fixed sentences:  
“The Guidelines as written, however, are not advisory; they are 
mandatory and binding on all judges . . . . Because they are 
binding on judges, we have consistently held that the Guidelines 
have the force and effect of laws.”50  For this reason, judges had 
no discretion to order a sentence that departed from the 
mandated guideline range.51  In fact, the Supreme Court 
specifically noted that departures were unavailable in most cases  
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230–31 (1999). 
44 See United States v. Rodriguez, 73 F.3d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
45 United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 361–62 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(Motz, J., dissenting). 
46 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 30. 
47 Id. at 1 n.1. 
48 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (Stevens, J., opinion of the 
Court). 
49 Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). 
50 Id. at 233–34 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court). 
51 Id. 
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and, if given, would be legally impermissible.52  Even if a 
sentencing judge departed from the Mandatory Guidelines, that 
judge’s decision to depart would have been reversed.53 
Ultimately, Booker held that the Mandatory Guidelines were 
unconstitutional because they violate the Sixth Amendment’s 
requirement that “juries, not judges . . . find facts relevant to 
sentencing.”54  Thus, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now 
only advisory.  It is important to remember that Booker only 
came down in 2005, which means that a multitude of defendant-
appellants were sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines since 
1984.55  In fact, the Supreme Court has recently noted that this 
precise issue “could determine the liberty of over 1,000 people.”56 
C. The Aftermath of Beckles 
Beckles is the most recent Supreme Court case to address the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Consequently, the importance of 
Beckles has yet to be fully realized or defined.  In Beckles, the 
Supreme Court held that the Advisory Guidelines are not void for 
vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.57  The Supreme Court explained that the twin 
concerns of the vagueness doctrine, notice and arbitrary 
enforcement, do not apply to the Advisory Guidelines.58  Indeed, 
the Advisory Guidelines do not invoke notice concerns since they 
are not mandatory, and there is no fear of arbitrary enforcement 
because the Advisory Guidelines are not directly enforceable at 
all.59 
In particular, Beckles states that there are only two kinds of 
criminal laws that can be challenged for vagueness: “laws that 
define criminal offenses and laws that fix the permissible 
sentences for criminal offenses.”60  As a result, one of the main 
issues in Beckles was whether the Advisory Guidelines “fix the 
permissible sentences for criminal offenses” so that they could be  
 
 
52 Id. at 234. 
53 Id. at 234–35. 
54 Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court). 
55 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 30. 
56 Brown v. United States, 586 U.S. __ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
57 Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 890 (2017). 
58 Id. at 894–95. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 892 (emphasis in original).  
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challenged under the vagueness doctrine.61  The Supreme Court 
held that the Advisory Guidelines “merely guide the exercise of a 
court’s discretion.”62 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Beckles addressed the 
Advisory Guidelines, but it did not directly speak to the 
Mandatory Guidelines.63  Yet Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
provides a glimmer of hope for defendants sentenced under the 
mandatory regime.  She wrote: 
The Court’s adherence to the formalistic distinction between 
mandatory and advisory rules at least leaves open the question 
whether defendants sentenced to terms of imprisonment before 
our decision in United States v. Booker—that is, during the 
period in which the Guidelines did “fix the permissible range of 
sentences”—may mount vagueness attacks on their sentences. 
That question is not presented by this case and I, like the 
majority, take no position on its appropriate resolution.64 
Although the Supreme Court addressed vagueness 
challenges to the Advisory Guidelines in Beckles, the Court did 
not directly address defendants sentenced under the Mandatory 
Guidelines.  This group of defendant-appellants uncovers a 
unique angle to Johnson II’s application under Beckles, which is 
whether a defendant can challenge his or her Mandatory 
Guidelines sentence retroactively under Johnson II.  The case 
law in the short period of time since Johnson II and Beckles were 
decided addresses—and dismisses—challenges to Advisory 
Guidelines sentences.  However, it is less clear what should 
happen to petitioners challenging their Mandatory Guidelines 
sentences as void for vagueness.  Federal courts are divided on 
this issue left open by the Supreme Court in Beckles. 
II. SOLUTIONS TO THIS DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
Fortunately, there is relevant case law that provides 
guidance on vagueness challenges.  First, Johnson II’s analysis of 
the ACCA demonstrates that a vagueness challenge should be 
available for defendants sentenced under the identical language 
of the Mandatory Guidelines’ residual clause.  Second, Welch 
illustrates that a vagueness challenge to the Mandatory 
 
61 Id. (emphasis in original). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 890. 
64 Id. at 903 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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Guidelines is workable in identical circumstances.  Third, 
vagueness challenges in other areas of law provide examples of 
when such challenges are not only permitted, but also successful. 
A. The Framework from Johnson II and the ACCA 
Currently, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are advisory.65  
Since Booker, the Supreme Court has revisited the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines several times.  In 2015, the Supreme 
Court held in Johnson II that the ACCA’s residual clause is void 
for vagueness.66  Again, Johnson II is important because the 
ACCA’s residual clause is identical to the residual clause in the 
Mandatory Guidelines.  Implementation of the ACCA in 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) resulted in an enhanced sentence for a 
defendant if he or she had three prior convictions that qualified 
as “violent felon[ies].”67  The residual clause in § 924(e)(2)(B) 
defined a violent felony to include “any felony that ‘involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another.’ ”68  The residual clause was to be applied by first 
having the court identify an “ordinary case” of the crime at hand; 
then, the court would determine whether the ordinary case of 
that crime would constitute a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another person.69 
The Court reasoned that “[b]y combining indeterminacy 
about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with 
indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to 
qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause produces more 
unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause 
 
65 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (Breyer, J., opinion of the 
Court). 
66 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
67 Id. at 2555; Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). 
68 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)). The full text of 
the statute defined a violent felony as: 
[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or 
any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, 
knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for 
such term if committed by an adult, that—(i) has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(2)(B). 
69 Moore v. United States, 871 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Johnson, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2557). 
2018] PROTECTING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 619 
tolerates.”70  The Court applied the vagueness doctrine to 
invalidate the ACCA’s residual clause under the Due Process 
Clause.71  The Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson II affects the 
Mandatory Guidelines because the definition of “crime of 
violence” in the Mandatory Guidelines is almost identical to the 
definition of “violent felony” in the ACCA.72  “Recognizing this 
resemblance, courts consistently have held that decisions 
construing one of these phrases generally inform the construction 
of the other.”73 
B. Welch’s Helping Hand in Defining Johnson II’s Framework 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Welch demonstrates that 
vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines can be 
workable.  In Welch, the Court held that Johnson II announced a 
substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on collateral 
review.74  First, the Court reasoned that Johnson II undoubtedly 
announced a new rule because it was not dictated by precedent.75  
Second, the Court reasoned that Johnson II announced a 
substantive rule because “it alters ‘the substantive reach of the 
[ACCA]’ such that a defendant can no longer be sentenced as an 
armed career criminal ‘based on’ the residual clause.”76  Because 
Johnson II announced a substantive rule, the Court held that it 
had retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.77 
As a result, Welch further pushed open the door for 
defendant-appellants challenging their sentences under the 
Mandatory Guidelines.  After Beckles, Welch’s reasoning 
facilitated void-for-vagueness challenges to the Mandatory 
 
70 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558. 
71 Id. at 2562–63. 
72 See Brown v. United States, 586 U.S. __ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that the residual clause in the Mandatory Guidelines contained the 
“exact same language” and was “identical” to the residual clause within the ACCA). 
73 United States v. Sumrall, 690 F.3d 42, 42–43 (quoting United States v. Jonas, 
689 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2012)). See discussion infra Part III.C. 
74 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). This is important since 
many defendant-appellants challenge their sentences as an application for leave to 
file a second or successive motion to vacate their sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2016, U.S. COURTS, http://www.us 
courts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2016 (last visited Oct. 
10, 2018).  
75 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1264. 
76 In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265). 
77 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. 
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Guidelines.  Generally, such challenges occur under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255.78  To grant a second or successive motion under 
§ 2255(h)(2), the court must determine that the petition contains 
(1) a new rule of constitutional law, (2) made retroactive to cases 
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, (3) that was 
previously unavailable.79 
Usually, a petition will meet all three elements.  First, the 
petition will likely lean on Johnson II, which announced as a new 
rule that “imposing an increased sentence under the residual 
clause of the [ACCA] violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due 
process” because it is void for vagueness.80  Second, the Supreme 
Court held that Johnson II “announce[s] a substantive rule that 
has retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.”81  Third, this 
rule was likely “previously unavailable” for petitioners sentenced 
before 2005 because Booker came down in 2005 and Johnson II 
came down in 2016.  Therefore, a court should grant a second or 
successive motion under § 2255(h)(2) if the appellant relies on 
Johnson II, which announced a new rule of constitutional law 
applicable retroactively, and the timeline shows that this rule 
was not previously available. 
A successful example of a § 2255(h)(2) claim is demonstrated 
by the First Circuit in Moore v. United States.82  There, the 
defendant-appellant Moore sought to file a successive motion to 
vacate his sentence under § 2255(h).83  The court illustrated 
Moore’s § 2255(h)(2) claim: 
The new rule upon which Moore’s motion relies, according to 
Moore, is that announced in Johnson [II].  Johnson II declared 
unconstitutionally vague the residual clause in the Armed 
Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) definition of a “violent felony.”  
The Supreme Court made Johnson II retroactive to cases on 
collateral review in Welch v. United States.  Moore seeks to 
argue in the district court that the new rule created by Johnson 
II invalidates the residual clause of the career offender 
guideline applied at his sentencing, which occurred before  
 
 
 
 
78 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2012). 
79 Id. 
80 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
81 Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268. 
82 871 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2017). 
83 Id. at 74. 
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United States v. Booker, made the guidelines advisory. For the 
following reasons, we grant Moore the certification he 
requests.84 
Moore also instructs that if it is unclear whether the defendant-
appellant identified a constitutional rule applicable to his or her 
situation, and “the question is close,” the circuit court should 
leave the issue for the district court to resolve.85  Thus, Moore 
demonstrates the legal argument defendant-appellants formulate 
when challenging their sentences under § 2255(h).86 
Alternatively, defendant-appellants may also challenge their 
Mandatory Guidelines sentences under § 2255(f)(3).  Because the 
statute of limitations would often prohibit a defendant sentenced 
under the Mandatory Guidelines before 2005 from bringing such 
a challenge, defendant-appellants often use this section of the 
statute to bring their claim.  Section 2255(f)(3) states that there 
is a one-year statute of limitations for attacking a sentence, and 
that this limitation period shall run from “the date on which the 
right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if 
that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”87 
Thus, under § 2255(h)(2) or § 2255(f)(3), defendant-
appellants must show that the Supreme Court has recognized a 
new rule or right.  For the same reasons discussed above, 
defendant-appellants should succeed on their § 2255(f)(3) 
motions because they are asserting the exact same right recently 
recognized in Johnson II.88  Therefore, vagueness challenges to 
the Mandatory Guidelines are workable, and § 2255 can be the 
vehicle for defendant-appellants to challenge their Mandatory 
Guidelines sentences. 
C. The Vagueness Doctrine and the Path of Other Vagueness 
Challenges 
1. Background on the Vagueness Doctrine 
Defendant-appellants challenge their Mandatory Guidelines 
sentences under the vagueness doctrine.  The vagueness doctrine 
is derived from the Supreme Court’s understanding that the Due 
 
84 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
85 Id. at 80. 
86 See, e.g., Remington v. United States, 872 F.3d 72, 75–76 (1st Cir. 2017). 
87 28 U.S.C.  § 2255(f)(3) (2012). 
88 See infra Part III.C. 
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Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “prohibits the 
Government from ‘taking away someone’s life, liberty, or 
property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give 
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so 
standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.’ ”89  Although 
limited in scope, the vagueness doctrine addresses two 
constitutional concerns: “providing notice and preventing 
arbitrary enforcement.”90  The vagueness doctrine requires 
clarity to defend the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process protections; 
therefore, laws that are impermissibly vague must be 
invalidated.91  Importantly, “a regulation is not vague because it 
may at times be difficult to prove an incriminating fact but 
rather because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved.”92 
The Supreme Court “invalidated two kinds of criminal laws 
as ‘void for vagueness’: laws that define criminal offenses and 
laws that fix the permissible sentences for criminal offenses.”93  
First, the vagueness doctrine “requires that a penal statute 
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and 
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”94  Second, the vagueness doctrine 
requires that “statutes fixing sentences must specify the range of 
available sentences with ‘sufficient clarity.’ ”95  Normally, a 
person who engages in conduct that is “clearly proscribed cannot 
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of 
others.”96 
Although the vagueness doctrine addresses these twin 
concerns, there is also a third aspect of the vagueness doctrine: 
“the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines 
 
89 Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017) (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015)); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 
285, 304 (2008). 
90 Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894; see also F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 
U.S. 239, 253 (2012). 
91 Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. at 253. 
92 Id.; see, e.g., Williams, 553 U.S. at 306 (“Thus, we have struck down statutes 
that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant's conduct was ‘annoying’ or 
‘indecent’—wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing 
context, or settled legal meanings.”). 
93 Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892 (emphasis in original). 
94 Id. (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). 
95 Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 
114, 123 (1979)). 
96 Williams, 553 U.S. at 304. 
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to govern law enforcement.”97  Without this requirement, “a 
criminal statute may permit ‘a standardless sweep [that] allows 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal 
predilections.’ ”98  The vagueness doctrine provides a basis for 
appellants to challenge their convictions for various crimes and 
sentences. 
2. Examples of Vagueness Challenges 
Other cases with vagueness challenges illustrate how such a 
challenge is brought and addressed.  For instance, in Coates v. 
City of Cincinnati, the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance 
that criminalized the assembly of people on a sidewalk if done in 
an “annoying” manner.99  The Supreme Court held that this 
ordinance was unconstitutional, in part, because it violated “the 
due process standard of vagueness.”100  The Court reasoned that 
this ordinance was “unconstitutionally vague because it subjects 
the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable 
standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the 
punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.”101  Moreover, 
the Court stated that the ordinance was vague because “no 
standard of conduct is specified at all.  As a result, ‘men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.’ ”102 
Similarly, in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court 
held that Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance was 
unconstitutionally vague.103  This ordinance made it a crime for 
people to disobey a police officer’s order to disperse and leave an 
area after the police officer, who reasonably believed that these 
people were gang members, thought they were remaining in one 
place with no apparent reason.104  Notably, any person who 
disobeyed the police officer’s order violated this ordinance, 
 
97 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 
(1974)). 
98 Id. (alteration in original) (citing Smith, 415 U.S. at 575). 
99 402 U.S. 611, 613 (1971). 
100 Id. at 615. 
101 Id. at 614. 
102 Id. (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)) 
(explaining that although the ordinance encompassed conduct the city could 
constitutionally prohibit, the city must enact and enforce ordinances “with 
reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited” and not “whether or not a 
policeman is annoyed”). 
103 527 U.S. 41, 45–46, 51 (1999). 
104 Id. at 47. 
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whether or not he or she was actually a gang member.105  Echoing 
the reasoning in Coates, the Court stated that an ordinance could 
be impermissibly vague if it does not establish standards to 
protect against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty.106  The Court 
reasoned that a facial challenge was appropriate because of the 
vagueness of this ordinance; specifically, the ordinance infringed 
on constitutionally protected rights and contained no mens rea 
requirement.107 
The Supreme Court also addressed the vagueness doctrine in 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.108  There, the plaintiffs 
brought a void-for-vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, 
which made it a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material 
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”109  
Ultimately, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ vagueness 
challenge lacked merit and thus must fail.110  The Court noted 
that a vagueness challenge under the Fifth Amendment does not 
need to involve a substantial amount of protected expression.111  
However, the plaintiffs there did not argue that the statute 
permitted too much enforcement discretion for the 
Government.112 
Drawing a distinction, the Court in Holder reflected on past 
cases that applied the vagueness doctrine—cases involving 
“wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, 
narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.”113  Yet in Holder, 
the statutory terms of “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” 
“service,” and “personnel” did not require “untethered, subjective 
judgments.”114  Furthermore, the Court noted that Congress 
narrowed the definitions of the statutes over time and also 
included a knowledge requirement in the statute.115  Finally, the 
Court stressed that the vagueness challenge must fail because 
the statutory terms clearly proscribed the plaintiff’s conduct.116 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 52 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358). 
107 Id. at 55 (“When vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it is subject to 
facial attack.”). 
108 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
109 Id. at 8 (alteration in original). 
110 Id. at 20–21. 
111 Id. at 20. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 20–21. 
115 Id. at 21. 
116 Id. 
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In summary, these vagueness cases illustrate that a statute 
is unconstitutionally vague when it proscribes conduct with an 
unascertainable standard or with no standard of conduct 
specified at all.  Without such standards defined, wholly 
subjective statutory definitions lead to the arbitrary deprivation 
of liberty.  These cases demonstrate that the twin concerns 
underlying the vagueness doctrine, notice and arbitrary 
enforcement, can lead a court to render a statute 
unconstitutionally vague. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NEED TO ALLOW VAGUENESS 
CHALLENGES TO THE MANDATORY GUIDELINES POST-BECKLES 
Since the Supreme Court decided Beckles in 2017, defendant-
appellants have flooded the lower federal courts with claims 
arising from this case.  The Court in Beckles held that the 
Advisory Guidelines were not void for vagueness,117 but it did not 
decide whether individuals sentenced under the Mandatory 
Guidelines could successfully raise vagueness challenges.118  The 
cases stemming from Beckles are divided on whether the 
Mandatory Guidelines can be challenged as void for vagueness.  
Yet there are four strong arguments that demonstrate such 
challenges should be permitted.  This Note argues that the 
Mandatory Guidelines should be vulnerable to vagueness 
challenges because (1) the Mandatory Guidelines implicate 
vagueness due process concerns; (2) Johnson II and Beckles 
permit vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines; 
(3) the ACCA and the Mandatory Guidelines should be treated 
identically; and (4) the Supreme Court has recognized a new rule 
applicable to the Mandatory Guidelines.  The lower federal courts 
are divided, and “[t]his important question . . . calls out for an 
answer.”119  Thus, the Supreme Court should definitively hold 
that the residual clause of the Mandatory Guidelines is subject to 
vagueness challenges. 
 
 
 
117 Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017). 
118 Id. at 903 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
119 United States v. Brown, 586 U.S.__ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
626 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:609   
A. The Mandatory Guidelines Implicate Vagueness Due Process  
Concerns 
The Mandatory Guidelines should be subject to vagueness 
challenges because they implicate the due process concerns 
underlying the vagueness doctrine.120  In United States v. Parks, 
the District Court of Colorado held exactly that, specifically 
stating that the Mandatory Guidelines did not provide notice or 
prevent arbitrary enforcement.121  First, the court held that the 
Mandatory Guidelines did not provide notice because “when a 
judge found that the [M]andatory Guidelines’ residual clause 
applied, that finding increased a defendant’s sentence above the 
maximum lawful sentence to which the defendant would be 
exposed without the finding.”122  Second, the court held that the 
Mandatory Guidelines invited arbitrary enforcement because 
they had to be enforced by the courts, with rare exceptions, and it 
was unclear whether the offender would face “a significant 
enhancement under the language of the clause.”123 
Chief Judge Roger Gregory’s dissent in United States v. 
Brown from the Fourth Circuit agreed that the Mandatory 
Guidelines did not provide notice and invited arbitrary 
enforcement.124  Citing both Johnson II and Welch, Chief Judge 
Gregory reasoned that “a defendant’s due process rights are 
violated when a court, using the categorical approach, fixes that 
defendant’s sentence based on a statute that fails to provide 
proper notice of what constitutes criminal conduct and requires 
courts to apply imprecise and indeterminate standards.”125  
Similarly, in Cross v. United States, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the residual clause of the Mandatory Guidelines 
implicated the twin concerns of the vagueness doctrine because it 
“impeded a person’s efforts to ‘regulate his conduct so as to avoid 
particular penalties’ and left it to the judge to ‘prescribe 
the . . . sentencing range available.’ ”126 
 
 
120 United States v. Parks, No. 03-CR-00490-WYD, 2017 WL 3732078, at *4 (D. 
Colo. Aug. 1, 2017). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at *5. 
124 868 F.3d 297, 307–08 (4th Cir. 2017) (Gregory, C.J., dissenting). 
125 Id. 
126 892 F.3d 288, 306 (7th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Beckles v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894–95 (2017)). 
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Additionally, the First Circuit in Moore v. United States gave 
the district court discretion to decide whether the Mandatory 
Guidelines were void for vagueness because the defendant did 
not qualify for a departure at sentencing.127  Months later, the 
District Court of Massachusetts explicitly stated that the 
Mandatory Guidelines were vulnerable to vagueness challenges 
because they were binding on judges.128  Therefore, the 
Mandatory Guidelines should be subject to vagueness challenges 
because they implicate the two foundational concerns underlying 
the vagueness doctrine: providing notice and preventing 
arbitrary enforcement by judges.129 
B. Johnson II and Beckles Permit Vagueness Challenges to the 
Mandatory Guidelines 
Beckles also triggered a series of cases that discussed 
whether Johnson II and Beckles permit vagueness challenges to 
the Mandatory Guidelines.  Although the Advisory Guidelines 
are not vulnerable to vagueness challenges, the Mandatory 
Guidelines “are not immune from constitutional scrutiny under 
other due process challenges, the Ex Post Facto clause, or the 
Eighth Amendment.”130  The Supreme Court held in Johnson II 
that the ACCA’s residual clause, which is identical to the 
residual clause of the Mandatory Guidelines, is void for 
vagueness.131  In Beckles, the Court held that the Advisory 
Guidelines were not vulnerable to vagueness challenges,132 
leaving open whether individuals sentenced under the 
Mandatory Guidelines could bring vagueness challenges.133  
Under the reasoning and holdings in both Johnson II and 
Beckles, the Court should permit vagueness challenges to the 
Mandatory Guidelines. 
 
127 871 F.3d 72, 84 (1st Cir. 2017). 
128 United States v. Roy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (D. Mass. 2017) (“The 
reasoning in Beckles depends on the advisory status of the Guidelines post-Booker 
and, as such, did not preclude vagueness challenges to the career offender provision 
as applied pre-Booker.”). 
129 Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017); see also F.C.C. v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253–54 (2012). 
130 Wilson F. Green & Marc A. Starrett, The Appellate Corner, 78 ALA. LAW. 224, 
232 (2017). 
131 See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
132 Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892. 
133 Id. at 903 n. 4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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In Moore, the First Circuit agreed.134  The First Circuit 
stated that “Beckles did not limit Johnson II to its facts. Rather, 
one can fairly and easily read Beckles as simply rejecting the 
application of the rule of Johnson II to the [A]dvisory 
[G]uidelines because, as a matter of statutory interpretation, 
those guidelines do not fix sentences.”135  The First Circuit 
further reasoned that Beckles left open the issue of the 
Mandatory Guidelines; consequently, the court acknowledged 
that the defendant was asserting the same right recognized by 
Johnson II.136  Thus, a petitioner should be able to successfully 
challenge his or her Mandatory Guidelines sentence as vague 
because Johnson II recognized this exact right. 
Similarly, in United States v. Roy, the District Court of 
Massachusetts held that “Beckles does not preclude application of 
Johnson II to the residual clause of the career offender 
guideline . . . .”137  The court reasoned that vagueness challenges 
to the Mandatory Guidelines were not precluded under Beckles 
because the Supreme Court based its decision on the advisory 
nature of the current Federal Sentencing Guidelines.138   
In addition, the Second Circuit stated that “Beckles did not 
clearly foreclose the argument” that the Mandatory Guidelines 
are vulnerable to vagueness challenges.139  In Parks, the District 
Court of Colorado repeated this assertion.140  That court explicitly 
agreed that Beckles did not foreclose relief for a defendant 
sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines.141  Even more, that 
court held that the defendant was entitled to relief under 
Johnson II.142  Accordingly, Beckles should not prohibit a 
Mandatory Guidelines petitioner from bringing a vagueness 
claim, and Johnson II should provide relief to such petitioners. 
Although several courts decided that Johnson II and Beckles 
do not apply to the Mandatory Guidelines, those courts applied 
flawed reasoning.143  In Davis v. United States, the Eastern 
 
134 871 F.3d 72, 83 (1st Cir. 2017). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 282 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (D. Mass. 2017). 
138 Id. 
139 Vargas v. United States, No. 16–2112 (L), 2017 WL 3699225, at *1 (2d Cir. 
May 8, 2017). 
140 No. 03-CR-00490-WYD, 2017 WL 3732078, at *7, *13 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2017). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at *13. 
143 Some district courts have reiterated the opinion that Johnson II solely 
applied to the ACCA and that Beckles intentionally avoids addressing the vagueness 
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District of Wisconsin held that Beckles demonstrated that 
Johnson II’s rationale does not apply to the Mandatory 
Guidelines.144  The court continued to find that Johnson II’s 
holding should exclude the expectation of defendants “to be free 
from a sentence arguably impacted by vague sentencing 
guidelines.”145  Yet this line of reasoning is inherently flawed:  
The Fifth Amendment expressly “prohibits the Government from 
‘taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal 
law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the 
conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary 
enforcement.’ ”146   
Consequently, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and 
remanded the district court’s opinion in Davis.  Citing Beckles, 
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the Mandatory Guidelines 
were vulnerable to vagueness challenges because they “impeded 
a person’s efforts to ‘regulate his conduct so as to avoid particular 
penalties’ and left it to the judge to ‘prescribe the . . . sentencing 
range available.’ ”147  Further, the Seventh Circuit stated that 
Johnson II retroactively applies to the Mandatory Guidelines and 
provides relief to defendant-appellants sentenced under the 
Mandatory Guidelines.148   
Defendants should be free from a sentence affected by vague 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  In fact, the Supreme Court has 
held that impermissibly vague laws must be invalidated.149  The 
heart of the vagueness doctrine requires that criminal statutes 
be defined with sufficient definiteness and clarity.150  Even more, 
the Court in Johnson II notes that “[t]he prohibition of vagueness 
in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized requirement, consonant 
 
doctrine with respect to the Mandatory Guidelines; thus, these courts assert that 
Johnson II and Beckles do not permit vagueness challenges to the Mandatory 
Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Baldwin, No. CR 00–105, 2017 WL 3730503, at 
*3 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 2017); Mitchell v. United States, No. 3:00-CR-00014, 2017 WL 
2275092, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 24, 2017). 
144 No. 16-C-747, 2017 WL 3129791, at *5 (E.D. Wis. July 21, 2017), rev’d and 
remanded by Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 2018). 
145 Id. 
146 Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017) (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015)); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 
285, 304 (2008). 
147 Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 306 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Beckles, 
137 S. Ct. at 894–95). 
148 Id. at 307. 
149 F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012). 
150 Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892. 
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alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of 
law,’ and a statute that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of due 
process.’ ”151  Therefore, any case law claiming the opposite is 
relying on unconstitutional principles. 
On that same note, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. 
Brown contended that Beckles established that Johnson II’s 
rationale could not be applied to similar residual clauses because 
the Supreme Court’s “carefully crafted” holding only addressed 
the Advisory Guidelines.152  However, Chief Judge Gregory’s 
dissent in Brown is more persuasive.  Chief Judge Gregory 
maintains that “Beckles and Booker merely reinforce that the 
right newly recognized in Johnson [II] is indeed applicable to [the 
defendant’s] claim.”153  He reasoned that Beckles only excluded 
the advisory sentencing provisions from Johnson II’s holding, but 
it “did not disturb Johnson[II]’s holding that where a vague 
sentencing provision operates to fix a defendant’s sentence under 
the categorical approach, it is susceptible to attack under the 
Due Process Clause.”154  The dissent summarized that Beckles 
“[shrunk] the universe of sentencing provisions susceptible to 
attack on vagueness grounds [and] reinforced that a defendant 
has the due process right—as newly recognized in Johnson [II]—
not to have his sentence fixed by the application of the 
categorical approach to an imprecise and indeterminate 
sentencing provision.”155 
In short, the Supreme Court’s holding in Beckles permits 
petitioners sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines to bring 
vagueness claims under Johnson II’s new rule.  Although the 
courts are somewhat split on whether Johnson II and Beckles 
allow vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines, the 
more persuasive case law explains that such challenges should be 
permitted under Johnson II, Beckles, and the Due Process 
Clause. 
 
151 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556–57 (2015) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
152 868 F.3d 297, 302–03 (4th Cir. 2017). 
153 Id. at 310 (Gregory, C.J., dissenting). 
154 Id. at 308 (emphasis omitted). 
155 Id.  
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C. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the ACCA Further 
Supports that the Mandatory Guidelines Should Be 
Vulnerable to Vagueness Challenges 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of the ACCA in Johnson II 
provides additional support for the proposition that void-for-
vagueness challenges should be allowed under the Mandatory 
Guidelines.  In Johnson II, the Supreme Court held that the 
ACCA’s residual clause, which is identical to the residual clause 
of the Mandatory Guidelines, is void for vagueness.156  With such 
exact similarities, it logically follows that the ACCA and the 
Mandatory Guidelines should be treated in the same manner.157  
In fact, “[r]ecognizing this resemblance, courts consistently have 
held that decisions construing one of these phrases generally 
inform the construction of the other.”158 
The First Circuit explicitly held that “Beckles did not limit 
Johnson II to its facts.”159  Following this precedent, the District 
Court of Massachusetts maintained that “a straightforward 
application of Johnson II” to the Mandatory Guidelines is 
appropriate because the Mandatory Guidelines’ residual clause 
tracks the residual clause of the ACCA.160  Furthermore, the 
District Court of Massachusetts declared that in Moore, the First 
Circuit rejected the reasoning of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
that Johnson II only applies to the ACCA.161 
In United States v. Costello, the Southern District of Ohio 
applied the vagueness doctrine to a defendant sentenced under 
the Mandatory Guidelines because under those guidelines, “the 
residual clause of the Guideline Career Offender requirement, 
which is textually the same as the clause declared 
unconstitutionally vague in Johnson [II], is also 
unconstitutionally vague.”162  The District Court of Colorado 
echoed this reasoning in Parks by drawing parallels between the 
 
156 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. 
157 United States v. Sumrall, 690 F.3d 42, 42–43. See also Brown v. United States, 
586 U.S. __ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“You might think that if a sequence of 
words that increases a person’s time in prison is unconstitutionally vague in one 
legally binding provision, that same sequence is unconstitutionally vague if it serves 
the same purpose in another legally binding provision.”). 
158 Id. (quoting United States v. Jonas, 689 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2012)). 
159 United States v. Roy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 421, 428 (D. Mass. 2017) (quoting 
Moore v. United States, 871 F.3d 72, 83 (1st Cir. 2017)). 
160 Id. (quoting Moore, 871 F.3d at 82). 
161 Id.; Moore, 871 F.3d at 83. 
162 No. 1:02-CR-089, 2017 WL 2666410, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2017) 
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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Mandatory Guidelines and the ACCA.163  The court noted that 
just as a sentencing judge was constrained under the ACCA, the 
sentencing judge in that case was legally bound to impose a 
sentence within the Mandatory Guidelines range.164  Further, the 
court stated that the Mandatory Guidelines implicate the same 
due process concerns as the ACCA had.165  The court observed 
that the residual clause in both the Mandatory Guidelines and 
the ACCA deprived the defendant of notice because it drove a 
defendant’s sentence above the maximum lawful sentence 
otherwise applicable.166  Additionally, the language in both 
residual clauses made it unclear whether the defendant risked a 
significant enhancement under the clause, which could implicate 
arbitrary enforcement by judges.167  From these cases, the 
Mandatory Guidelines clearly implicate the dual concerns 
underlying the vagueness doctrine, just as the ACCA had. 
Chief Judge Gregory’s dissent in Brown reiterated that the 
Mandatory Guidelines should be treated the same way as the 
ACCA was because of the identical language of the residual 
clauses and due process concerns.168  He explained that “the 
residual clause at issue here . . . contained in the Mandatory 
Sentencing Guidelines, rather than the ACCA, is a distinction 
without a difference” because the “clauses’ text is identical, and 
courts applied them using the same categorical approach and for 
the same ends—to fix a defendant’s sentence.”169  Therefore, 
Chief Judge Gregory argued that Johnson II’s new right is 
applicable to a defendant sentenced under the Mandatory 
Guidelines because the “residual clause presents the same 
problems of notice and arbitrary enforcement as the ACCA’s 
residual clause at issue in Johnson [II].”170  Because the 
Mandatory Guidelines invoke the same due process concerns as 
the ACCA, both residual clauses should be treated the same way. 
 
 
163 See United States v. Parks, No. 03-CR-00490-WYD, 2017 WL 3732078, at *5 
(D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2017). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015)). 
168 United States v. Brown, 868 F.3d 297, 310 (4th Cir. 2017) (Gregory, J., 
dissenting). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
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There is a dearth of case law opposing the above cases on 
this point, and the courts that do come out on the other side of 
this particular issue do not provide any effective reasoning.  For 
example, the Western District of Virginia, without explanation, 
claimed that it is “clear” that Johnson II’s holding only applied to 
the ACCA and did not extend to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.171  But such conclusory judgments cannot be upheld 
when constitutional rights are involved.  Few courts support this 
incomplete finding, but, interestingly, those that do also concede 
that the text of the residual clauses in the ACCA and Mandatory 
Guidelines are “identically worded.”172  Although these cases 
claim that there are “fundamental difference[s]” between the two 
residual clauses, they do not detail these differences or the effects 
of these alleged differences.173  As a result, this argument is 
without merit.  The identical residual clauses within the ACCA 
and the Mandatory Guidelines should be treated in the same 
manner, and defendant-appellants should be able to challenge 
their Mandatory Guidelines sentences as void for vagueness. 
D. The Supreme Court Has Recognized a New Rule in Johnson 
II that Is Applicable to the Mandatory Guidelines 
Any argument contending that statutory and constitutional 
interpretations do not permit vagueness challenges to the 
Mandatory Guidelines is meritless.  This argument contends that 
because only the Supreme Court can announce a new rule that is 
retroactive on collateral review, and the Supreme Court has not 
explicitly announced a rule applying to the Mandatory 
Guidelines under Johnson II, no new rule has been announced 
and therefore cannot be applied to the Mandatory Guidelines.  
Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have maintained this 
position, claiming that because Beckles left open the question 
whether the Mandatory Guidelines can be void for vagueness, 
that open question cannot comprise a right recognized by the 
Supreme Court.174  Other district courts have agreed, reasoning 
 
171 Mitchell v. United States, No. 3:00-CR-00014, 2017 WL 2275092, at *4 (W.D. 
Va. May 24, 2017). 
172 Brown, 868 F.3d at 302 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Beckles v. 
United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 890 (2017)). 
173 Id.; United States v. Hurlburt, 835 F.3d 715, 726 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton, 
J., dissenting), abrogated by Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). 
174 Brown, 868 F.3d at 301; Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 
2017). 
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that defendant-appellants making this argument are asking 
courts to “extend” Johnson II’s holding to the Mandatory 
Guidelines.175  These courts state that this would allow the lower 
federal courts to make a new rule, which is only within the 
Supreme Court’s power.176  Yet even within those district courts, 
judges have granted a certificate of appealability on this issue.177 
Nevertheless, federal courts should apply the vagueness 
doctrine to the Mandatory Guidelines under Johnson II and 
Beckles because doing so would not create a new rule of 
constitutional law.178  The Supreme Court in Chaidez v. United 
States specifically held that “a case does not announce a new 
rule, [when] it [is] merely an application of the principle that 
governed a prior decision to a different set of facts.”179  Thus, a 
lower federal court that applies Johnson II’s holding to the 
Mandatory Guidelines would not be announcing a new rule; 
rather, it would be applying Johnson II’s principle to the 
analogous cases of Mandatory Guidelines petitioners. 
For example, the First Circuit in Moore reasoned that “one 
can fairly and easily read Beckles as simply rejecting the 
application of the rule of Johnson II to the Advisory Guidelines 
because, as a matter of statutory interpretation, those guidelines 
do not fix sentences.”180  The court continued, “[w]hat Beckles left 
open, then, was a question of statutory interpretation concerning 
how mandatory the [Federal Sentencing Guidelines were] before 
Booker.”181  Consequently, the First Circuit held that the 
defendant sought to assert the right exactly recognized by 
Johnson II.182   
 
175 United States v. Kenney, No. 1:92-CR-22, 2017 WL 3602038, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 
Aug. 22, 2017); Mitchell, 2017 WL 2275092, at *5. See also United States v. Gholson, 
No. 3:99CR178, 2017 WL 6031812, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 5, 2017); United States v. 
Blair, No. 1:01-CR-297, 2017 WL 5451714, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2017). 
176 Kenney, 2017 WL 3602038, at *3; Mitchell, 2017 WL 2275092, at *5. See also 
United States v. Aguilar, No. 02-40035-01-JAR, 2017 WL 3674976, at *2 (D. Kan. 
Aug. 23, 2017) (claiming that the defendant could not assert a vagueness claim 
under the Mandatory Guidelines because the Supreme Court has not yet recognized 
that right). 
177 See, e.g., United States v. Graham, No. 99-10023-01-JTM (Criminal), 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75419, at *2–3 (D. Kan. May 4, 2018); Kenney, 2017 WL 3602038, 
at *4. 
178 See United States v. Roy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 421, 428 (D. Mass. 2017). 
179 568 U.S. 342, 347–48 (2013) (alterations in original) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
180 Moore v. United States, 871 F.3d 72, 83 (1st Cir. 2017). 
181 Id. 
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Likewise, the District Court of Massachusetts reasoned that 
“the task at hand is not fashioning a new rule of constitutional 
law, but rather simply interpreting a statute.”183  Importantly, 
the court noted that the Mandatory Guidelines were binding on 
judges, which made them “vulnerable to vagueness challenges 
under the rule adopted in Johnson II.”184  Applying Johnson II’s 
holding to the Mandatory Guidelines would therefore not be 
announcing a new rule; instead, it would be applying Johnson 
II’s rule to analogous facts through statutory interpretation.  
Vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines should thus 
be permitted. 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal defendants sentenced under the Mandatory 
Guidelines should not be left without a path to challenge the 
unconstitutional vagueness of their sentences.  Multitudes of 
defendants have been sentenced under the constitutionally 
problematic Mandatory Guidelines.  Specifically, the Mandatory 
Guidelines invoke the twin concerns of the vagueness doctrine:  
to protect individuals from lack of notice and from arbitrary 
enforcement by judges.  The Mandatory Guidelines are thus 
infringing on individuals’ constitutional rights.  Johnson II and 
Beckles permit such vagueness challenges for individuals 
sentenced under the Mandatory Guidelines; the ACCA’s residual 
clause is identical to that of the Mandatory Guidelines, and the 
new rule announced in Johnson II is applicable to the Mandatory 
Guidelines. Thus, such challenges are workable under the 
framework of both Johnson II and Welch. 
Vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines will 
provide various benefits.  First, such challenges bring practical 
value.  Definitively stating that the Mandatory Guidelines are 
amenable to vagueness challenges will reduce the eruption of 
litigation in lower federal courts surrounding such challenges.  
This solution will alleviate administrative concerns.  Second, 
permitting vagueness challenges to the Mandatory Guidelines 
will finally close the chapter of ambiguity in federal sentencing.  
This will be the final step in moving away from the 
unconstitutionality of the Mandatory Guidelines and the 
vagueness due process concerns implicated by this sentencing 
 
183 Roy, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 428. 
184 Id. 
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regime.  To not address this imminent question in the affirmative 
will jeopardize the constitutional rights of many defendant-
appellants.  
 The Supreme Court must answer this “important question of 
federal law that has divided the courts of appeals.”185  The 
“liberty of over 1,000 people” is at stake.186  As Justice Sotomayor 
articulated, “[t]hat sounds like the kind of case [the Supreme 
Court] ought to hear.”187  Therefore, the Supreme Court should 
hear a case on this important issue and hold that the Mandatory 
Guidelines are amenable to vagueness challenges.  
 
185 Brown v. United States, 586 U.S. __ (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
